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REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MODELS IN EUROPE 
AND AFRICA: 
A COMPARISON 
L INTRODUCTION 
There seems to be universal acceptance of the abstract con-
cept of human rights as rights or entitlements which societies 
ought to recognize, and which exist even when there is no positive 
recognition or legal enforcement of them within any given 
society.1 Human rights are championed by nearly everyone in the 
abstract; however, concrete human rights issues almost inevitably 
become the subject of bitter controversy.2 If one begins with the 
concept of a basic human right to life, when does that right begin? 
Does the right to life include a right to mental equilibrium as well 
as physical integrity? Do human rights also include political and 
civil rights to participate in the function of the state? What about 
social and economic rights? Are the rights, however defined, ab-
solute?3 The fact of cultural diversity in our world makes answer-
ing these questions about the specific content and scope of human 
rights a monumental, and perhaps insurmountable, problem.4 
There is a common sense logic which informs us that, 
however difficult to define, there are some core values which 
1. Philosophers differ in their analyses of how one can know that such rights exist. 
Intuition, reason, religion, and utility have all been offered as the basis for human rights. 
For a discussion of the conceptual problems of human rights, see Gewirth, The Basis and 
Content of Human Rights, 13 GA. L. REV. 1143 (1978-79). 
2. The subject of human rights is highly charged with emotion. Throughout history 
both secular and religious groups have committed atrocities in a spirit of righteousness. The 
fifteenth century Spanish inquisition serves as an example of moral outrage against those 
who affirmed a different religious heritage. Christian Bay discusses the potential develop-
ment of a universal notion of human rights based on a fundamental humanist premise and an 
understanding of human biological and psychological needs. See Bay, Universal Human 
Rights Priorities: Toward a Rational Order , in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEM-
PORARY ISSUES 5 (J. Nelson & v. Green eds. 1980). 
3. The meanings and foundations of human rights have been diversely interpreted. 
For contemporary philosophical perspectives on the conception, meaning, and application of 
human rights, see the collection of essays in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES (A. Rosenbaum ed. 1980). 
4. There are enormous variations in the specific customs, religions, moral norms, and 
political practices of the world's peoples, as well as differences in the degrees to which 
societies tolerate such traits as individualism or violence. For a discussion of these factors in 
the context of human rights, see Nickel, Cultural Diversity and Human Rights, in INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 43. 
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should be respected by all organized societies. This is illustrated 
by the European reaction to Nazi leaders who, during World War 
II, deported millions of civilians to slave labor and death camps, 
where these innocent people were treated with barbaric cruelty, 
and where many were eventually murdered.5 An outraged public 
declared that these actions constituted crimes against humanity, 
and spurred an unprecedented legal proceeding which brought 
Nazi leaders and their subordinate officials to account before an 
international tribunal at Nuremberg.6 
Assuming that a fundamental humanist premise permits us to 
acknowledge the existence of some basic human rights, questions 
abound regarding their practical implications in national and inter-
national policy. Through what structures should they be pro-
tected? How can a state's interest in protecting human rights 
worldwide be reconciled with its interest in preserving exclusive 
jurisdiction over its own local affairs?7 Are there universally ac-
cepted procedural rights which could substitute for a consensus on 
substantive human rights?8 
Human rights protections are influenced by political realities. 
The well-established notion of the supremacy of the sovereign 
5. For documentation of the Nazi acts regarding slave labor, concentration camps, 
and persecution of the Jews, see u .s. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALI-
TY, I NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 875-1022 (1946). 
6. On August 8, 1945, the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entered into an agreement establishing the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals. An annexed charter invested the 
Tribunal with power to try and punish persons who had committed crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The legal developments and considerations which 
underlie this agreement are discussed in s. GLUECK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AG-
GRESSIVE WAR (1946). Information about the trial and judgments can be found in B. SMITH, 
REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (1977). For an analysis of the relationship of the 
Nuremberg principles to emerging international law, see A. KLAFKOWSKI, THE NUREMBERG 
PRINCIPLES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966). 
7. Systematic abuses of human rights are almost always associated with repressive 
features of the governing process, particularly in authoritarian regimes. Effective ap-
proaches to world order and human rights cannot neglect the internal life of sovereign 
states. For an analysis of this problem, see R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
(1981). 
8. One writer has searched the municipal laws of various sovereign states for some 
general principles of human rights which would be recognized by all nations. Her thesis is 
that if a state recognizes any human rights, it must recognize some prerequisite procedural 
laws in order to protect them. She would use a procedural guarantee, such as freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and detention, as a starting point for the development of international 
human rights. See Maki, General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by All Na-
tions: Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, 10 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 272 (1980). 
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state9 has often permitted those states which are powerful enough 
to impose their will on their own people to do so. This idea of 
sovereignty can shield abuses of human rights committed within 
state territory .10 
Because, in fact, there are gross inequalities between states, 
patterns of external control over states also exist. 11 Such external 
control was clearly manifested during the colonial period, when 
European nations decided the destinies of African peoples through 
imperial patterns of control.12 Although most countries are now 
free of colonial rule, 13 the supposition still exists that some implicit 
correlation between power and virtue gives powerful states a 
mandate to impose their will on weaker states.14 
Recognizing that the traditional ordering of sovereign states 
9. Jean Bodin's analysis of political authority, published in 1606, was the first to ex-
press the concept of the supremacy of the state, and the state's right to make its own laws. 
His analysis still fits our modern political structures, and his concept of sovereignty sur-
vives as a central feature of Western political thought. J. BODIN, THE Six BOOKES OF A CoM-
MONWEALE passim (McRae ed. 1962). 
10. The belief in political order through sovereign states requires that one accept 
each government's own interpretation of its obligations in relation to its own citizens. 
Where human rights abuses arise, domestic challenges to the repressive regime can result 
in new political arrangements. Interference from other sovereign states is not sanctioned. 
Those who defend this political order point out that outside intervenors, whatever their 
humanitarian motivation, are also oriented around selfish ends, such as increased power, 
wealth, or prestige. Intervention, motivated at least in part by self-interest, all too often 
leads to yet another state taking counterintervention measures which are intended to 
neutralize the first intervention. In fact, each state wants to prevail over- rather than 
neutralize-the other, and either direct intervention or support via arms or capital 
escalates the original problem and multiplies the abuses. Falk refers to this ordering of 
political life as "statist logic." R. FALK, supra note 7, at 35-38. 
11. Imperial patterns of control were formally upheld in both the conquest of the New 
World and the colonization of Africa. These patterns were often justified by humanitarian 
or civilizing claims. Although the doctrinal support for such patterns has eroded, strong 
states still frequently attempt to influence weaker ones through diplomatic pressures or by 
covert means. Id. at 38-42. 
12. Colonial rule in Africa lasted from approximately 1830-1962. For an anthology of 
primary resources which reflects both European and African viewpoints during that period, 
see COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA (B. Fetter ed. 1979). 
13. By May 1980, only Namibia remained under foreign domination. 
14. Falk refers to this ordering of political life as "hegemonial logic." Hegemonial logic 
still exists in informal patterns and covert forms. For example, the United States' proclama-
tion of human rights diplomacy, under the Carter administration, entailed a hegemonial at-
titude toward the internal affairs of foreign countries to the extent that they could be con-
trolled by diplomatic pressures, the withholding of aid or credits, or the giving of aid or 
comfort to dissident elements in the society. A human rights rationale can be used as a 
rallying cry to engender support for waging geopolitical struggles which have goals 
unrelated to human rights. See R. FALK, supra note 7, at 38-42. 
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makes it difficult to deal effectively with human rights problems, 
some modern states have encouraged the creation of supra-
national organizations which have the protection of human rights 
as their goal.15 Supranational organizations, made up of represen-
tatives from member states, are frequently constrained, however, 
by the individual will of their dominant states, by their lack of 
financial independence and sanctioning capabilities, and by a lack 
of consensus as to the content and scope of the rights to be pro-
tected.16 
Regardless of a state's legal authority or political autonomy, 
significant abuses of human rights can arouse the conscience of 
private citizens, who may seek to marshall world public opinion to 
pressure the political actors to change their behavior.17 Private 
citizens have organized into such bodies as Amnesty Inter-
national18 and the International League for Human Rights19 to 
work regularly for the advancement of human rights. Such groups 
have the advantage of relative freedom from political influence, 
and exert a selective but important informal pressure on states. 
15. The first significant international human rights effort was the anti-slavery move-
ment of the nineteenth century. The League of Nations and the International Labour 
Organization both emerged in the post World War I period while the United Nations and 
the European Convention on Human Rights were organized at the end of World War II. 
Human rights concerns have been kept alive in recent decades by increasing number of in-
ternational declarations and resolutions, multilateral treaties, and regional conventions. 
See, Bilder, The Status of International Human Rights Law: An Overview, in INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (J. Tuttle ed. 1978). 
16. For example, with respect to human rights, the main global arena of supranational 
activity has been the General Assembly of the United Nations. The General Assembly, 
which is dominated by governments concerned with protecting their state sovereignty, is 
the forum in which the principal concerns of world public opinion are given expression. This 
frequently results in contradictory signals, with strong human rights rhetoric, but selective 
moral perception. See R. FALK, supra note 7, at 45-49. 
17. The loud cries to topple the Ugandan regime under Idi Amin serve as a recent ex-
ample. In effect, the contention was that the regime in place was so bad by objective moral 
standards that the only appropriate question was whether it was possible for an outsider to 
intervene effectively. See R. FALK, supra note 7, at 43. 
18. Amnesty International, founded in 1961, is a worldwide movement, independent of 
any government, which focuses concern strictly upon the plight of prisoners. It seeks the 
release of prisoners of conscience, fair and early trials for political prisoners, and the 
elimination of the death penalty and torture, or any cruel or degrading treatment, for all 
prisoners. It is organized in 37 countries, and has individual members in an additional 74 
countries, with its headquarters in London. 
19. The International League for Human Rights has concerned itself with human 
rights violations for more than 35 years. It has headquarters in the United States and at the 
United Nations, and has 40 affiliates throughout the world. See 3 HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNA-
TIONAL DOCUMENTS 1639 (J. Joyce ed. 1978). 
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This establishes a climate of concern over particular patterns of 
abuse, and builds popular support for taking human rights serious-
ly.20 
Neither sovereign states, which are autonomous, nor supra-
national human rights organizations, which depend upon volun-
tary patterns of compliance, nor private organizations, which lack 
resources and enforcement mechanisms, however, can adequately 
protect human rights. A protective mechanism is needed which 
will function at an intermediate level, exercising authority which 
is broader than the sovereign state yet closer to the affected com-
munities than a global supranational organization. This can be 
achieved through regional human rights organizations.21 
In our increasingly complex and interrelated world, sovereign 
states perceive that many important economic, environmental, 
and security needs can best be met through cooperation. Many 
states already pool their administrative controls and resources in 
order to meet political, economic, and defense objectives. 22 States 
working in concert to perform mutually important tasks are likely 
to experience a decrease in political antagonisms which would be 
difficult to achieve directly.23 Thus, the recognition of in-
terdependence and the negotiation of international obligations are 
20. The notion that certain rights inhere in human nature gives rise to what Falk 
terms "naturalist logic." The appeal to naturalist logic is an appeal to the conscience of the 
political actor, and of the world community. See R. FALK, supra note 7, at 42-45. 
21. During the September 1967 proceedings of the Seventh Nobel Symposium in Oslo, 
some opposition to the regional approach to human rights was expressed. Concern centered 
around the potential for (1) overlapping procedures and institutions, (2) inconsistencies in 
substantive law, and (3) the diversion of attention away from efforts to achieve a universal 
forum. However, the consensus of the speakers was that regional systems offer a desirable 
grassroots beginning for human rights protection, and should coexist with universal 
systems. See INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 292-97 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds. 
1968). 
22. For example: defense (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact), 
political influence (Council of Europe, Organization of American States, Organization of 
African Unity), and economic cooperation (European Economic Community and its Soviet 
analogue COMECON, the Latin American Free Trade Association, and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development). For an introduction to the regional approach to 
human rights, see R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF 
LAW AND POLICY 547-663 (1979). 
23. When states cooperate in this way they transfer small pieces of their sovereignty 
to the entrusted central authority. Over time this accumulation of partial transfers shifts 
some of the allegiance of the citizens of the participating states to the organization through 
which they are achieving, or at least working toward, their goals. Ideological or political 
cohesion, which is difficult to achieve direclty, evolves in this process. R. POLLACK, THE IN-
DIVIDUAL'S RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 55-59 (1966). 
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functional ways to diminish the sovereignty principle. Economic 
and diplomatic sanctions will also be more effective where there is 
genuine interdependence.24 
Regional cooperation can both facilitate the development of 
mechanisms to protect human rights and help to transform univer-
sal proclamations of human rights into specific realities.25 This 
Note will compare the development and organization of the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (European Convention), the oldest regional 
human rights structure, with the Charter of Human and Peoples' 
Rights (African Charter), the newest regional human rights struc-
ture. 
IL THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Europe was shattered into a political vacuum by World War 
II. The European Convention was created in 1950 by a generation 
of Europeans scarred by the atrocities perpetrated by the Axis 
powers, particularly the Nazis,26 and faced with a growing 
ideological conflict between East and West.27 
Historically, Europe developed the concept of the nation 
state, with its concomitant notion of state sovereignty.28 At the 
24. As a genuine interdependence is achieved, the expectations of the several states 
will converge into more or less identical aims. Consequently, states are likely to respect the 
diplomatic stance of the cooperating states. When this is not the case, however, the socio-
economic ties which were part of the integrative process insure that economic sanctions will 
have a direct impact on the uncooperative state. Id. 
25. For a discussion of the geopolitical realities which make regionalism in the context 
of human rights protections viable, and for an overview of the various regional human 
rights mechanisms, see Pinto, Regionalisme et Universalisme dans la Protection des Droits 
de L 'homme, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 177. 
26. Sohn discusses this post World War II development of theories designed to pro-
tect human beings on the international level, and responds to criticisms of these interna-
tional efforts to protect human rights which have been made by a younger generation, born 
after the holocaust. Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent 
Criticisms, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 347 (1981). 
27. The events of history had made European countries especially conscious of the 
value of democracy. The communist threat was very real to Europeans at the close of World 
War II. In the year between the Hague Congress (May 1948) and the signing of the Statute 
of the Council of Europe (May 1949), Europe witnessed the seizure of Czechoslovakia, civil 
war in Greece, and the Berlin Blockade. A. H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 1-14 
(1963). 
28. In the medieval age, laws were considered to be static, consonant with the laws of 
God and nature, and the concept of social change was largely absent. Jean Bodin, a six-
teenth century political philosopher, developed the concepts of the sovereignty of the state, 
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same time, European states were culturally identifiable units with 
the cause of individual human rights firmly rooted in their past: 
The Magna Carta (1215),29 the English Bill of Rights (1689),30 and 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1793)31 all empha-
sized a liberal attitude toward individual rights. Consequently, 
when faced with a growing communist threat, post-war European 
states, bound by their common ideologies, were ready to delegate 
some of their sovereign powers to protect those ideologies.32 This 
willingness to transfer sovereignty is the key to a workable inter-
national organization.33 
A variety of post-war organizations sprang up to foster Euro-
pean unity.34 The Brussels Treaty,35 signed in March 1948, created 
a Consultative Council composed of the foreign ministers of the 
signatories. The French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, proposed to 
and emphasized the state's fundamental power to make laws. He believed that the 
sovereign was absolute, and that the duty of a subject was to obey the sovereign without 
question. Bodin relied upon natural law as a foundation for two limitations upon the 
sovereign: he was bound to keep his promises and to respect private property. J. BODIN, 
supra note 9. 
29. The Magna Carta granted individual liberties to all free men throughout the 
English realm. It also confirmed general liberties of the church, and freedom of elections. 
For a history of the Charter and its text, see J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (1965). 
30. The Bill of Rights removed the power of any monarch to suspend the operation of 
law, and gave Parliament the sole power to levy taxes. This climaxed a long struggle be-
tween the English monarch and Parliament, and finally established the supremacy of Parlia-
ment. D.C.M. y ARDLEY. INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 29 (3d ed. 1969). 
31. In this document, the ancient doctrine of natural law, based on reason, found ex-
pression as a theory of rights. It remains as a classic formulation of the inviolable rights of 
the individual vis-a-vis of the state. For a brief history of the relationship between natural 
law and human rights, see Castberg, Natural Law and Human Rights, An Idea-Historical 
Survey, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 13. 
32. They were seeking to protect their way of life through a peaceful association of 
democratic states, however, not through a military alliance. See A. H. ROBERTSON, supra 
note 27, at 4. 
33. R. POLLACK, supra note 23, at 55-59. 
34. The United Europe Movement, the Economic League for European Co-operation, 
the French Council for United Europe, the European Union of Federalists, Nouvelles 
Equipes Internationales and the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe, along 
with some other groups, united in 1948 to form the International Committee of the 
Movements for European Unity. R. BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 17 (1980). 
35. Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 
Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 152 (effective Aug. 25, 1948). This treaty was signed in Brussels 
by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. (This treaty 
and many of the other statutes and materials cited in this Note are reprinted in a single 
volume collection of documents relating to the United Nations and to regional international 
organizations. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION AND INTEGRATION (H.F. VanPanhuys, L.J. 
Brinkhorst, H.H. Maas eds. 1968)). 
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this body that a European Parliament be created.36 His proposal 
ultimately led to the signing of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe on May 5, 1949.37 
The concepts of democracy and human rights emerged as the 
fundamental elements in the Council's overall plan for the unifica-
tion of Europe.38 References to human rights in the Statute were 
not mere affirmations of faith- they were made conditions of 
membership.39 European leaders feared any encroachment on in-
dividual liberty, believing that dictatorships and the gradual sup-
pression of human rights were the root causes of war.40 
The first international treaty to mention human rights was 
the Charter of the United Nations,41 signed in 1945. The Universal 
36. The Council set up a five-power Committee for the Study of European Unity. The 
United Kingdom proposed a purely intergovernmental consultative organ, but the continen-
tal countries wanted a European Assembly. At one point the talks broke down, and the 
possibility of creating a European Assembly without British participation was debated. The 
United Kingdom ultimately agreed to the idea of an Assembly. R. BEDDARD, supra note 34, 
at 18. 
37. The Statute of the Council of Europe was signed in London by Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and 
Sweden. Its aim was to achieve a greater unity of European states. The protection of human 
rights was both a declared purpose of the Council and a condition for membership. Statute 
of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N .T.S. 103 [hereinafter cited as Council Statute]. 
The Council met for the first time in August 1949, and set as its first task the development 
of a European convention on human rights. L. MIKAELSEN, EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 11 (1980). 
38. The Preamble of the Statute declares that the contracting parties are "[r]eaffirm-
ing their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their 
peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, prin-
ciples which form the basis of all genuine democracy .... " Council Statute, supra note 37, 
preamble, para. 2. 
39. "Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of 
law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms .... " Council Statute, supra note 37, art. 3. "Any Member of the Council 
of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights or 
representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw under Article 7. 
If such Member does not comply with this request, the Committee may decide that it has 
ceased to be a Member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may determine." 
Id. arts. 7-8. 
40. Many of the leading European statesmen of the postwar epoch had been in the 
resistance or in prison, and they were acutely conscious of the need to prevent any recur-
rence of dictatorship in Western Europe. See A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 27, at 5-6. 
41. Signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, it declared that "[w]e the peoples of the 
United Nations, determined ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the digni-
ty and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small ... have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims." U.N. 
CHARTER preamble, para. 1-3. 
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Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),42 proclaimed 
by the U.N. General Assembly three years later, enumerated 
general human rights principles which each member government 
was expected to implement in accordance with its own law.43 This 
document had moral value and authority, but no practical legal ef-
fect. 
In August 1949, following a general debate on the subject of 
human rights at the first session of the Council of Europe, M. 
Pierre-Henri Teitgen of France made a formal proposal44 for the 
establishment of an organization to ensure the collective 
guarantee of human rights. The Committee45 assigned to report on 
this proposal relied for its input upon both a document submitted 
to the Council by the International Juridical Section of the Euro-
pean Movement46 and the Universal Declaration. The Committee 
Report,47 adopted on September 8, 1949, recommended that the 
Council of Europe members bind themselves to respect such fun-
damental principles of democracy as free elections, universal suf-
frage, and secret ballot.48 In addition, the Committee recom-
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 
(1948). [hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration]. 
43. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the right to life, liberty, and 
the security of person; to recognition as a person before the law, with equal protection of 
the law; and to a fair and public hearing in the determination of any criminal charge. It in-
cludes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of expression, peaceful 
assembly, and association; and freedom from slavery, torture, cruel or degrading treatment, 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, and arbitrary interference with private matters. It in-
cludes freedom of movement, the right to own property, and the right to participate in one's 
government. It also enumerates the right to freely choose one's work, and to be assured of 
an adequate standard of living, an education, and freedom to participate in the cultural life 
of the community. Id. 
44. Motion of M. Teitgen, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, and others, Eur. Consult. Ass'n., 1st 
Sess., Doc. No. 3 (1949). 
45. The Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions, presided over by Sir 
David Maxwell Fyfe, with M. Antonio Azara (Italy) as vice-chairman and M. Pierre-Henri 
Teitgen (France) as reporter. A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 27, at 9. 
46. The International Juridical Section of the European Movement wanted to see the 
establishment of a European Convention through which parties would undertake to uphold 
the fundamental liberties of their citizens, and of a European Court which would adjudicate 
alleged violations of those liberties. In July 1949, they had submitted a draft proposal for 
such a convention to the Council of Europe, and had requested that the matter be placed on 
the agenda for the Council's first session. Although the matter was not placed on the agenda 
for the first session, the draft proposal later played a significant role in the committee 
deliberations. Id. at 7-9. 
47. Report of the Committee, Eur. Consult. Ass'n., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 77 (1949). 
48. Recommendation 38, Texts Adopted by the Assembly 49 (1949). 
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mended that member states and private individuals and associa-
tions be permitted to bring any alleged breach of these principles 
before a European Commission on Human Rights.49 
B. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
After extended negotiations over the next several months, 
the European Convention was drafted in its final form and signed 
in Rome on November 4, 1950.50 Unlike the Universal Declaration, 
which merely enumerated human rights,51 the European Conven-
tion stated precise definitions of the rights to be safeguarded, and 
of the permitted limitations on those rights.52 This clear state-
ment, which eased the task of determining whether a state had 
violated its obligations under the Convention, reflects one of the 
strengths of a regional declaration, wherein a greater consensus 
can be achieved than is possible in a global declaration.53 The Euro-
pean Convention thus defined the scope of the guaranteed rights 
and established both the European Commission of Human Rights54 
and the European Court of Human Rights55 as the machinery for 
insuring the continued observation of these rights. 
49. The institution of an effective remedy for the citizen whose rights were infringed 
by a sovereign state was thus proposed for the first time. A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 27, at 
10. 
50. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as European Convention]. For 
background material on the many committees, meetings, and drafts leading up to the sign-
ing of the final text, see A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 27, at 10-12. 
51. Universal Declaration, supra note 42. 
52. For example, article 5 of the European Convention states that everyone has the 
right to liberty and security of person. It then delineates six circumstances under which, 
following procedures prescribed by law, the right to liberty can be curtailed. Finally, for 
those whose liberty is curtailed, it lists specific rights which must be allowed, and provides 
for compensation for any victims of arrest or detention in contravention of the article. Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 50, art. 5. 
53. One danger of this increased clarity is that unintentional omissions can later be 
construed as deliberate exclusions. This problem can be met by additions to the original 
document, and in fact several Protocols have been added to the European Convention. See 
infra text accompanying notes 96-106. 
54. Articles 20-37 of the European Convention set out the provisions for the Commis-
sion. Article 24 provides that any party to the Convention can refer any alleged breach of 
the Convention to the Commission. Article 25 permits any individual or non-governmental 
organization to petition the Commission, provided the party against which the complaint is 
lodged has recognized the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions. Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 50, arts. 20-37. 
55. Articles 38-56 of the European Convention set out the provisions for the Court. 
Article 44 provides that only parties to the Convention and the Commission shall have the 
right to bring a case before the Court. Article 52 provides that the decision of the Court is 
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The European Convention itself, including its Commission,56 
its Court, and its body of case law57 and procedure,58 constitutes a 
relatively complete legal system. The Convention is also an inter-
national agreement between states which are sometimes reluctant 
to have their freedom impaired by a supranational body. Some of 
the European states have incorporated the European Convention 
into their domestic law.59 In those states where it has not been in-
corporated, the Convention can still be cited as a persuasive 
source of law before domestic courts.60 
In recent years, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities61 has made increasing references to the European Con-
vention. Some legal scholars have argued that the Convention has 
thereby been incorporated into the body of European Community 
law.62 If this view is accepted, the European Convention's provi-
sions would have to be applied when European community law is 
applied, even where the Convention has not been formally incor-
porated into the internal law of the state.63 For example, in Great 
Britain, where the Convention has not been incorporated into 
final, and article 54 provides that the Committee of Ministers shall supervise its execution. 
Id. arts. 38-56. 
56. For a recent work on the practice and procedure of the Commission on the Ad-
missibility of application, see L. MIKAELSEN, supra note 37. 
57. Reasons must be given for the judgments of the Court, and any judge is permitted 
to deliver a separate opinion. European Convention, supra note 50, art. 51. 
58. The Court is required to draw up its rules and determine its procedure. Id. art. 55. 
The Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, drawn up in Strasbourg on 
September 18, 1959, are reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION AND INTEGRATION, supra 
note 35, at 945 [hereinafter cited as Rules of Procedure]. 
59. Six of the founding member states of the European Communities have incor-
porated the Convention into their domestic law: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See Drzemczewski, The Domestic Ap-
plication of the European Human Rights Convention as European Community Law, 30 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 118, 119 (1981). 
60. The remaining three founding member states, Denmark, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom, have not incorporated the Convention into their legal systems. Id. 
61. The Court of Justice of the European Communities came into existence in 1952 to 
ensure the observance of law in the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty 
establishing the European Steel and Coal Community. The functions of the Court was 
enlarged to include the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community as they were formed. Background on the jurisdiction and procedure of this 
Court can be found in E. w ALL, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
(1966). 
62. The treatment of international obligations in domestic law is constitutionally 
uncertain, incredibly complex, and constantly evolving in European Community law. See 
Opsahl, Human Rights Today: International Obligations and National Implementation, 23 
SCANDANAVIAN STUD. IN LAW 149 (1979). 
63. Drzemczewski, supra note 59, at 119. 
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domestic law, the courts have developed a presumption that 
Parliament does not legislate contrary to the United Kingdom's 
international commitments. This presumption has been used by 
British courts to interpret ambiguous legislation in accordance 
with the European Convention.64 
The Council of Europe bears the expenses of the Commission 
and the Court.65 The Committee of Ministers, the executive 
decision-making body of the Council of Europe, is responsible for 
the election of members to the Commission.66 When a question is 
referred to the Court and a judgment is handed down, the Com-
mittee of Ministers must supervise the execution of that judg-
ment.67 When a question is not referred to the Court, the Commit-
tee of Ministers decides whether or not there has been a human 
rights violation.68 
The overwhelming amount of work under the European Con-
vention is done by the Commission, which has final and 
unreviewable say on the issue of the admissibility of applications 
made by individuals.69 When an application is admitted, the Com-
mission initially takes the role of the factfinder, with wide powers 
of investigation,70 and then acts as mediator, seeking a friendly 
settlement between the state and the applicant.71 
64. On a number of occasions, English courts engaged in statutory interpretation have 
referred to the European Convention. Lord Denning, M.R. said that "if there is any am-
biguity in our statutes or uncertainty in our law, th.en these courts can look to the Conven-
tion as an aid to clear up the ambiguity or uncertainty, seeking always to bring them into 
harmony with it." [1976) 3 ALL E.R. 843, 847f; [1976] 1 W.L.R. 979, 989G. For a comprehen-
sive look at the relationship between English law and the European Convention, see Duffy, 
English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585 
(1980). 
65. European Convention, supra note 50, art. 58. 
66. The Committee of Ministers elects the Commission members by an absolute ma-
jority of votes. The number of Commission members must equal the number of contracting 
parties, and no two members can be nationals of the same state. Id. arts. 20-21. 
67. Id. art. 54. 
68. Id. art. 32. 
69. Between 1955 and 1979 the Commission decided on the admissibility of 8100 for-
mally registered cases. This represents only a fraction of the cases brought to the attention 
of the Commission, however, since nearly 2000 provisional files are opened annually. Thus, 
only one in eight cases are ever formally registered. Of those cases that were registered 
during the 1955-1979 period, only 200 were accepted by the Commission. L. MIKAELSEN, 
supra note 37, at xiii. 
70. In the event of the acceptance of a petition, the Commission, together with the 
representatives of the parties, can undertake an investigation. The states concerned are re-
quired to furnish all necessary facilities for the effective conduct of that investigation. Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 50, art. 28. 
71. If a settlement is reached, the Commission must draw up a report confined to a 
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If settlement is not reached, the Commission must draw up a 
report and make a finding as to whether a violation of the Euro-
pean Convention has occurred.72 This report is submitted to the 
Committee of Ministers and the states concerned, but is not 
published at that time.73 During the next three months, an appeal 
to the Court can be made by either the Commission or the states,74 
assuming the state either consents or has accepted the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction.75 Court proceedings constitute not merely 
an appeal on a point of law, but an entirely new hearing.76 The 
Commission, acting in the public interest, represents the applicant 
before the Court. 77 
If neither the state nor the Commission brings the case before 
the Court, the Committee of Ministers can make a final determina-
tion. 78 When the Committee of Ministers finds a violation, it 
specifies corrective measures which the offending state must take 
within a prescribed time.79 If these measures are not followed, the 
Committee may determine what effect shall be given to the 
original decision of the Commission and then publish its final 
report.80 
The substantive content of the human rights protected by the 
European Convention and their permitted restrictions, contain no 
innovations: they are equivalent to those rights already found in 
the majority of the member states' constitutions. Included are the 
brief statement of the facts and the solution. This is sent to the states concerned and the 
Committee of Ministers, and to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe for publica· 
tion. Id. art. 30. 
72. Id. art. 31. 
73. Id. art. 32. 
7 4. Id. art. 48. 
75. See supra note 59. 
76. Rules 37·42 of The Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights 
direct themselves to the conduct of oral hearings. Rules of Procedure, supra note 58, at 
954-55. 
77. At this stage, the complaining party has no control over her case. She can neither 
appeal to the Court nor have standing as a party. She may appear as a witness, but only if 
one of the parties or the Court seeks her testimony, not as a right. Even if she wishes to 
drop the matter entirely, the Commission can ignore her wishes and continue the case if it 
deems that course to be in the public interest. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 
562. 
78. The decison that there has been a violation of the Convention requires an affir· 
mative vote by two-thirds of the Committee members. European Convention, supra note 50, 
art. 32, § 1. 
79. Id. art. 32, § 2. 
80. Id. art. 32, § 3. 
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right to life,81 freedom from torture or degrading punishment,82 
freedom from slavery,83 liberty and security of person,84 fair and 
public trial,85 freedom from liability for acts not crimes when com-
mitted,86 respect for privacy,87 freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion,88 freedom of expression,89 freedom of association and 
peaceful assembly,90 and freedom to marry and raise a family. 91 
The European Convention both protects the individual from 
discrimination on any ground,92 and guarantees an effective 
81. The right to life is qualified by permitting the deprivation of life following the con-
viction of a crime for which that penalty is provided by law. Nor is the article contravened if 
death results from the use of no more force than is necessary to defend any person from 
unlawful violence, to effect a lawful arrest, to prevent the escape of any person lawfully de-
tained, or, in action lawfully taken, to quell a riot or insurrection. Id. art. 2. 
82. No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Id. art. 3. 
83. Slavery and forced or compulsory labor are prohibited. Work required during 
lawful detention, compulsory military service, service exacted in the face of an emergency 
or calamity threatening a community, and normal civil obligations, however, are excluded 
from the term "forced or compulsory labor." Id. art. 4. 
84. The right to liberty and security of person is guaranteed. Id. art. 5. For the limita-
tions on that right, see supra note 52. 
85. The definition of a fair and public hearing includes a reasonable time period, an 
impartial tribunal, a presumption of innocence, information as to the charge, time and 
facilities for preparing a defense, legal assistance, and the opportunity to examine 
witnesses. European Convention, supra note 50, art. 6. 
86. One cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense for any act or omission which is 
not an offense at the time committed; one cannot have any heavier penalty imposed than the 
one applicable at the time a crime was committed. Id. art. 7. 
87. One's private and family life, home, and correspondence must be respected. In-
terference with one's privacy is permitted only in accordance with law, and shall be limited 
to those occasions where it is necessary in the interests of national security or economic 
well-being, or to protect public safety, health, morals, or the freedom of others. Id. art. 8. 
88. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion are protected. The freedom to 
change one's belief and to manifest one's belief, so long as this does not interfere with socie-
ty's interest in safety, health or morals, or the freedom of others, is also protected. Id. art. 9. 
89. Freedom of expression is protected, including the right to receive and impart in-
formation. Conditions, restrictions, or penalties can be prescribed by law as necessary to 
preserve a democratic society, prevent disorder and crime, protect health or morals, pre-
vent disclosure of confidential information, or maintain the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. Id. art. 10. 
90. The right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association are protected, including 
the right to form and join trade unions. Restrictions can be prescribed by law in order to 
protect the interests of society. Id. art. 11. 
91. The right of men and women of matrimonial age to marry and establish a family 
according to national laws is protected. Id. art. 12. 
92. The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Conventions shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground, including sex, race, color, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, pro-
perty, birth, or other status. Id. art. 14. 
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remedy before a national authority to anyone whose rights have 
been violated.93 Within specified limits, however, states are per-
mitted to derogate from their obligations under the Convention 
during times of emergency .94 Additionally, the Convention may be 
applied to international territories whose foreign policy is essen-
tially controlled by member states.95 
The First Protocol to the European Convention was signed in 
Paris on March 20, 1952.96 It added to the protected freedoms the 
peaceful enjoyment of individual possessions,97 the right to educa-
tion,98 and the right to free elections.99 A Second Protocol, signed 
in Strasbourg on May 6, 1963,100 conferred upon the Court com-
petence to give advisory opinions.101 A few months later, on 
September 16, 1963, a Fourth Protocol1°2 expanded the protected 
rights and freedoms. The right to liberty despite inability to fulfill 
93. Those whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority, notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. Id. art. 13. 
94. Limited derogation of a state's obligations under the Convention are permitted 
during war or other emergencies that threaten the life of the nation. This does not include 
any derogation from article 2 (except in respect to death from lawful acts of war), or from 
articles 3, 4, or 7. Id. art. 15. 
95. This is the so-called "colonial clause." European Convention, supra note 50, art. 63. 
There had been debate over whether the Convention should automatically apply to overseas 
territories of the member states, unless specifically.excluded by the member state. Instead, 
it was decided that the Convention would apply to those territories only by the express 
declaration of the member state. R. BEDDARD, supra note 34, at 26. 
96. Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, March 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter cited as Protocol 1]. The 
recommendations to include the right of property, the right of parents to choose the educa-
tion of their children, and the right to free elections, had first been made in August 1950, 
prior to the acceptance of the European Convention. Consensus was not reached on these 
proposals, however, and rather than defer signing the Convention, the decision was made to 
include a Protocol at a later date, should agreement be reached. A.H. ROBERTSON, supra 
note 27, at 12-13. 
97. No one shall be deprived of possessions except in the public interest and subject 
to conditions provided for by law. Protocol 1, supra note 96, art. 1. 
98. The state, in exercising its function of education, shall respect the right of parents 
to ensure teaching in conformity with their religions and philosophical convictions. Id. art. 2. 
99. Free elections shall be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot. Id. art. 3. 
100. Protocol No. 2 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, May 6, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 44 [hereinafter cited as Protocol 2]. 
101. The Court is permitted, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, to give ad-
visory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the 
Protocols, but not on the content or scope of the protected rights and freedoms. Id. art. 1. 
102. Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, September 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46 [hereinafter cited as Protocol 
4]. 
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a contract, 103 liberty of movement and choice of residence, 104 and 
freedom from expulsion for nationals105 as well as from collective 
expulsion for aliens, 106 were all included in the Fourth Protocol. 
The most unique feature of the European Convention is the 
right of an individual to petition an international tribunal 
directly .101 Although this right is severely limited by the ad-
missibility requirements of the Convention, 108 there are few places 
in international law where the locus standi of individuals has been 
recognized at all. It is the European Convention which has 
demonstrated the feasibility of that course of action for the 
future. 109 
!IL THE AFRICAN CHARTER 
A. BACKGROUND 
European and African socio-political structures followed very 
different paths of development. The state as an institution emerged 
relatively early in Europe.11° Citizens in these emerging states lack-
103. Id. art. 1. 
104. Freedom of movement and choice of residence are protected, and the right to 
leave any country, including one's own, is conferred. However, this right can be restricted 
J:>y law if that is necessary for the protection of the public interest in a democratic society. 
Id. art. 2. 
105. No nationals, as individuals or as a group, can be expelled from or denied the rig~t 
to enter the state of which they are a national. Id. art. 3. 
106. Id. art. 4. It should be noted that many states consider the Fourth Protocol to be 
poorly drafted, and only Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden have 
ratified it. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION AND INTEGRATION, supra note 35, at attached 
Table Showing the Deposit of Ratifications of Council of Europe Conventions and 
Agreements. 
107. Any person, non·governmental organization, or group of individuals claiming to be 
a victim of a violation of the Convention by one of the contracting parties may petition the 
Commission through the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. European Convention, 
supra note 50, art. 25. 
108. The Convention requires, as a prerequisite, the exhaustion of local remedies and 
that the petition be submitted within six months of the final domestic decision. The petition 
may not be anonymous. It may not duplicate a matter already examined by the Commission, 
nor can it have been subject to examination by other international organizations. It cannot 
be incompatible with the Convention, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of peti-
tion. Id. arts. 26-27. Ninety percent of all petitions are ruled inadmissible because they do 
not meet these requirements. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 561. 
109. It is debatable whether the European Convention should be looked upon primarily 
as a source of relief for the individual. Perhaps the individual is the catalyst which reveals 
where the state falls short of the Convention standard. Because application to the Commis-
sion can create a great deal of publicity, mere involvement in the procedure serves to bring 
the alleged shortcomings of the state to the attention of the world and concomitantly sen-
sitizes states to the quality of life of their citizens. See R. BEDDARD, supra note 34, at 172-74. 
110. See supra note 29. 
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ed personal intermediary relationships with their rulers, and were 
quick to demand institutional guarantees of justice.111 Consequently, 
Western constitutional governments focused their attention on such 
concepts as individual worth, personal autonomy, and private 
ownership of property .112 
Most Africans, in the pre-colonial period, 113 lived in family, 
clan, or kinship groups. For them, survival against nature and 
hostile tribes depended upon internal social harmony and political 
equilibrium, with communal responsibility for protecting and 
maintaining the life of the group. 114 Thus, the Western hero, 
fighting to preserve his domain against the oppressive forces of 
society, was alien to the African, whose culture tended to be 
egalitarian and anti-heroic in nature.115 
European law, introduced into Africa during the colonial 
period, failed to meet the needs of the average African. 116 Only a 
small percentage of the African elite ever engaged in legal tran-
sactions. The majority of Africans were alienated from Western 
law because of its professionalized processes and institutions, as 
well as the language, literacy, demographic and cultural 
barriers. 117 Nor did African state boundaries, drawn by the Euro-
111. See supra notes 30-32. 
112. ld. 
113. Pre-colonial Africa encompasses the period before 1830, when European holdings 
consisted primarily of Portuguese enclaves, slave-trading operations, and provision posts 
along the coast. The French annexation of Algeria in 1830 was the first European claim to 
densely populated African lands. See COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA, supra note 12, at 3. 
114. The communal nature of pre-colonial Africa is discussed in Mojekwu, Interna-
tional Human Rights: The African Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 2, at 85. For a table comparing the general features of official state legal systems to 
traditional community legal systems, see Paul, Human Rights and Legal Development: 
Observations of Some African Experiences, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND 
PRACTICE 23, 33-35 (J. Tuttle ed. 1978). 
115. Economic and political distributive justice is exhibited in a rich variety of forms in 
African cultures. See Legesse, Human Rights in African Political Culture, in THE MORAL 
IMPERATIVES OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A WORLD SURVEY 123 (K. Thompson ed. 1980). 
116. Rural people, living at subsistence levels and engaging in barter modes of 
economic life, regulated their affairs by custom. Normally, their contact with colonial law 
was limited to sanctions involving tax and agricultural regulations. Paul, supra note 114, at 
25. 
117. A result of this separation between Africans and the law introduced by their col-
onial rulers is the simultaneous existence of several legal orders in modern African states. 
Customary law survives among many of the rural people; colonial laws are embedded in the 
inherited legal order; and new laws are being created by the independent states. The in-
terplay of these legal systems, and the role they play in African economic development, are 
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pean powers in order to administer their territories, consider 
African cultural and ethnic identities.118 Consequently, European 
law was generally perceived by Africans as an authoritarian 
device used primarily to coerce, regulate, and tax them. 119 The 
European presence in Africa, therefore, was widely resented.120 In 
the course of this century, the African drive for independence has 
achieved significant success.121 
The period of European domination left many of the newly in-
dependent African states internally linked by a common language, 
a uniform educational structure, and a national administrative 
system capable of nurturing democratic political conditions.122 The 
Africans, however, with little experience and few skills in 
legislative decision-making, were also left to face grave economic 
problems 123 and divided tribal loyalties.124 In an effort to exercise 
examined in Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 999. 
118. During a fifty-year period, African political entities, which had little connection 
with the shape or organization of preexisting societies, were created by the arbitrary deci-
sions of the European Colonial powers: Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain. 
Burundi, Rwanda, Lesotho, and Swaziland are the few exceptions whose present boundaries 
bear a resemblance to the pre-colonial political units. KANNYO, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 10-11 (May 1980) (Report prepared for the International League 
for Human Rights) [hereinafter cited as KANNYO, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS]. 
119. See supra note 116. 
120. In the early years of colonial rule, few Africans possessed the combination of ad-
ministrative skill and self-confidence necessary to organize a nationalist movement. The 
spread of nationalism is associated with improved transportation and communication, as 
well as with the desire of African people to gain control of their political destiny and 
economic resources. COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA, supra note 12, at 139. 
121. World War II destroyed the notion of colonial invulnerability and hastened the 
move toward independence. After the War, the Allies found that the humanitarian ra-
tionalizations for their imperial patterns of control were discredited. The European Powers 
were constrained to obey the legal system which they had formerly manipulated to the 
disadvantage of their charges. While many regimes yielded only when faced with political 
insurrections by the Africian majority which they had formerly kept under control, other 
governments made arrangements for an orderly transfer of power to the African states. In-
dependence was virtually completed in the years between 1957-1962, after which only the 
oldest white settlements in southern Africa remained in control of the indigenous popula-
tion. Id. at 163. 
122. Paul, supra note 114, at 23. 
123. Africa has the lowest gross national product and the lowest per capita income in 
the world, with the highest underemployment and unemployment rates. At the same time, 
Africa is experiencing an explosive population growth. Gopal, Africa's Evolving Political 
"Club", 27 WORLD PRESS REV. 49 (Dec. 1980). 
124. Millions of men, women, and children are driven across borders by wars between 
tribes, regions, and countries. The number of refugees in recent years has risen from one 
18
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 9
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/9
1983] Human Rights in Europe and Africa 153 
effective control of their citizens, African leaders, almost without 
exception, renounced democracy in favor of one-party political 
systems.125 Many of these governments were soon seized by strong 
executives, military cabals, or dictators. The erosion of human 
rights, in this respect was usually not far behind.126 
In this context of political instability, 127 the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963.128 According to the 
Preamble to the Charter of the OAU, its purposes include pro-
moting solidarity among the independent African countries, 129 
safeguarding their independence, sovereignty, and territorial in-
tegrity, 130 and fighting against neo-colonialism in all its forms. 131 
Although the OA U Charter affirms the adherence of the OA U to 
the Charter of the. United Nations and to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, 132 it does not specifically mention the promo-
tion of human rights as one of its goals. Thus, the primary objec-
tive of the OA U has been African solidarity, just as the primary 
objective of the Council of Europe was European unity .133 
The OA U is a fragile political entity, 134 and human rights 
million in 1975 to five million in 1981. Africa's Legions of Refugees Ask the World for Help, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, at A2, col. 3. 
125. For a discussion of the problems encountered in the transition from colonial rule 
to independence, and of the trend toward one party rule, see Ebiasah, Africa: New Masters, 
New Slaves, 8 HUM. RTS. 10 (Summer 1979). 
126. When citizens live in a perpetual state of emergency, facing economic and political 
instability, human rights may be infringed upon in an effort to maintain an orderly, if not a.. 
representative, government. Id. at 13. 
127. In 1958, when Ghana organized a Conference of Independent African States, there 
were only nine such states: South Africa (not represented at the Conference), Ghana, 
Liberia, Egypt, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, and Morocco. Two years later, by the time 
of the Second Conference, there were fifteen independent African states. Three years later, 
in 1963, there were thirty-two independent African states. Id. at 11-12. 
128. The heads of thirty African states signed the Charter of the OAU in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. Charter of the Organizations of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (ef-
fective Sept. 13, 1963) [hereinafter cited as OAU Charter]. 
129. The Preamble speaks of the inalienable right of all people to control their own 
destiny. Id. preamble, para. 4. At that time, a large number of African states were not yet 
independent, and a major impetus for the OA U was the desire to complete the process of 
decolonization. KANNYO, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 118, at 15. 
130. OAU Charter, supra note 128, preamble, para. 6. 
131. Id. preamble, para. 6. 
132. Id. preamble, para. 8. 
133. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
134. Sharp rivalries often exist among the OAU members, who represent widely dif-
ferent states. African nations are significantly disparate with respect to size, population, 
ethnic structure, and ideological pretensions. Gopal, supra note 123, at 49. 
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violations among its members present one of its most delicate 
challenges.135 Over the years, the OAU has issued strongly worded 
resolutions urging the severance of diplomatic ties with colonial 
and racist regimes.136 The OA U, however, has virtually ignored 
violations in independent African states.137 One of the major 
justifications for this silence has been the principle, found in the 
OA U Charter, of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
member states.138 
During the past decade, notorious abuses of human rights in 
Uganda,139 Equatorial Guinea,140 and the Central African Empire141 
placed OAU member states in the dilemma of having to choose 
between condemning those regimes, possibly to the detriment of 
the organization's fragile unity, or appearing to acquiesce in the 
atrocities. The first major public challenge to the OA U stance was 
posed in 1975, when Tanzania objected to the convening of the 
Twelfth Assembly of the OAU in Kampala, Uganda, on grounds of 
President Amin's human rights violations.142 Although this at-
tempt to block the meeting failed, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Botswana boycotted the Assembly, and the proceedings showed 
135. For a criticism of the OA U's reluctance to take a firm stand against human rights 
violations in independent African states, see Hall, The Curious Blindspot of the OA U, 9 
HUM. RTS. 11 (Summer 1981). 
136. Intense OA U concern was focused on racial strife in Rhodesia during the period 
from 1963 until that country gained independence as Zimbabwe in 1979. Strong OA U resolu-
tions have similarly consistently condemned South Africa's apartheid policy urging that 
comprehensive sanctions be employed against that country. Id. at 34-35. 
137. The OAU failed to take any significant action in response to human rights viola-
tions in Rwanda and Burundi. Although some OAU member states criticized the Ugandan 
government, the OAU as a body never forced Amin to answer for his atrocities. Id. at 36-37. 
138. "The Member States ... solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the 
following principles: ... (2) non-interference in the internal affairs of States .... " OA U 
Charter, supra note 128, art. III, no. 2. 
139. President Idi Amin's rule in Uganda from 1971-1979 was described as a "reign of 
terror" by Amnesty International. According to evidence given to the United Nations, an 
estimated 250,000 people were killed, many with incredible cruelty, and thousands fled into 
exile. See Weinstein, Human Rights in Africa: A Long-Awaited Voice, 78 CURRENT HISTORY 
97 (March 1980). 
140. Under President Macias Nguema's rule in Equatorial Guinea from 1972-1979, an 
estimated one-third of the population either fled or was killed. Id. at 130. 
141. Jean Bedel Bokassa's rule in the Central African Empire from 1965-1979 evidenc-
ed no respect for fundamental rights. The worst scandal associated with his regime was an 
allegation that he participated in the massacre of more than 100 schoolchildren in April 
1979. Id. at 130-31. 
142. Kannyo, Human Rights in Africa, 37 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 14, 16 (Dec. 
1981) [hereinafter cited as Kannyo, Human Rights in Africa). 
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that some of the participating states felt uneasy about the Amin 
regime.143 
Other events likewise pressed the OAU for action on human 
rights issues.144 In the 1969 United Nations seminar on the 
desirability and prospects for the establishment of an African 
human rights commission, 145 the participants requested the OA U 
states to convene a preparatory committee as a step toward the 
establishment of a regional commission for human rights for 
Africa.146 In 1979, at a second United Nations seminar,147 experts 
produced a fifteen-article draft for an African human rights com-
mission,148 and submitted it to the OA U for its consideration as a 
model for an African Commission on Human Rights. 149 
The International Commission of Jurists150 and the Institute 
of International Law and Economic Development,151 among other 
organizations, 152 also sponsored conferences and seminars concern-
ing human rights in Africa. More importantly, the wanton destruc-
tion of human life in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, and the Central 
African Empire153 ultimately gave the OA U the political will to 
143. Id. 
144. Some of the international pressures for the establishment of a regional African 
human rights mechanism are discussed in KANNYO, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 
118, at 24-30. 
145. Representatives from twenty African countries were brought together in Cairo, 
Egypt. Id. at 25. 
146. United Nations, Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on 
Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa, Cairo, UAR, September 2-15, 1969, Doc. 
ST/TAO/HR/38. 
147. Representatives from thirty African countries were brought together in 
Monrovia, Liberia. KANNYO, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 118, at 27-28. 
148. United Nations, Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on 
Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa, Monrovia, Liberia, September 10-21, 1979, 
Doc. ST/HR/SER. A/4. 
149. Weinstein, supra note 139, at 131. 
150. The International Commission of Jurists (!CJ) is a nongovernmental organization 
with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. It has organized a number of conferences and 
seminars in different parts of Africa on the subject of the rule of law. 
151. The Institute of International Law and Economic Development has its head-
quarters in Washington, D.C. The Institute and Faculty of Law of the National University 
of Rwanda organized a colloquium of human rights and economic development held in 
Butare, Rwanda, in 1978. 
152. For example, concern for human rights dominated the third general meeting of 
the African Bar Association, held in August 1978. Also, the 1979 Pan-African Conference on 
Refugees, initiated by the All Africa Conference of Churches, concluded that human rights 
violations are the root cause of Africa's refugee problem. See Weinstein, supra note 139, at 
99. 
153. See supra notes 139-141. 
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create a human rights mechanism, just as the Nazi atrocities had 
served as a catalyst for the European Convention. 154 
The OAU, at its sixteenth session, in July 1979, resolved to 
"organize as soon as possible, in an African capital, a restricted 
meeting of highly qualified experts to prepare a preliminary draft 
of an 'African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights' providing in-
ter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect 
human and peoples' rights." 155 During the following November, the 
first of several working sessions on the draft was held in Dakar, 
Senegal.156 
In July 1981, a draft Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
was presented to the summit meeting of the OAU, held in Nairobi, 
Kenya. 157 After only minor revisions, the draft was approved. 158 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights will come into 
force three months after the reception, by the OA U Secretary-
General, of the instruments of ratification from a simple majority 
of the OAU member states.159 
B. THE AFRICAN CHARTER 
The Preamble of the African Charter both recognizes a need 
for international protection of human rights,160 and declares that 
the enjoyment of rights and freedoms implies the performance of 
duties. 161 The Preamble adds a new dimension to regional human 
rights agreements by declaring that it is essential to pay attention 
to the right to development. 162 Although the African Charter is 
very much like the European Convention in the way it seeks to 
154. See supra notes 5, 6 & 27 and accompanying text. 
155. Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Sixteenth 
Ordinary Session of the OAU, Monrovia, Liberia, July 17-20, 1979. 
156. KANNYO, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 118, at 33. 
157. Kannyo, Human Rights in Africa, supra note 142, at 18. 
158. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights has not yet gone into effect or 
been published in any official source. It can be obtained from Mulualem Teferi, Document 
Officer, OAU, 211 East 43rd Street, N.Y., N.Y. 10017 [hereinafter cited as African Charter]. 
159. Id. art. 63, § 1. 
160. "Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the at-
tributes of human beings, which justifies their international protection ... . "Id. preamble, 
para. 6. 
161. "Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the perfor-
mance of duties on the part of everyone ... . "Id. preamble, para. 7. 
162. "Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right 
to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, 
social, and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction 
22
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 9
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/9
1983) Human Rights in Europe and Africa 157 
protect civil and political rights, 163 it moves beyond the traditional 
Western concept of individual rights by its equal emphasis on 
economic, social, and cultural rights.164 
Many of the individual rights set out by the African Charter 
parallel those recognized by the European Convention: that in-
dividuals, without discrimination, 165 shall be equal before the 
law,166 shall have the right to life and integrity of their person,167 
shall not be kept in slavery or punished in an inhumane or 
degrading way, 168 shall not be deprived of freedom except for 
reasons previously delineated,169 shall be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty, and shall have the right to counsel and trial before 
a competent tribunal.110 The Charter also recognizes the freedoms 
of conscience and religion;111 the right to receive and disseminate 
information;172 and the right to freedom of association, 173 subject 
only to necessary restrictions enacted in the interest of national 
security or the social welfare.174 The African Charter protects the 
freedom of movement and the right to asylum, and prohibits the 
of economic, social, and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights .... " Id. preamble, para. 8. 
163. Compare supra text accompanying notes 81-106, with infra text accompanying 
notes 165-81. 
164. European concern about economic and social development expressed itself in the 
creation of the European Communities (European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community in 1957, and the European Economic Community in 1957), 
rather than in a concept of economic rights as human rights to be secured under the Euro-
pean Convention. See P. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1980). 
165. "Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and free-
doms ... without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other 
status." African Charter, supra note 158, art. 2. 
166. Id. art. 3. 
167. Id. art. 4. 
168. "All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave 
trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited." 
Id. art. 5. 
169. Id. art. 6. 
170. "Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard .... No one may be 
condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at 
the time it was committed .... Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the of-
fender." Id. art. 7. 
171. Id. art. 8. 
172. Id. art. 9. 
173. Id. art. 10. 
174. "The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided 
for by law in particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, 
ethics, and rights and freedoms of others." Id. art. 11. 
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mass expulsion of nonnationals.175 It also guarantees the right to 
participate in one's government and to have equal access to public 
services;176 the right to property,177 to work,178 to protection of one's 
health,179 and to an education and cultural life;180 and the right to 
protection for families, the aged, and the disabled.181 
Just as the European Convention sets up a European Com-
mission of Human Rights,182 the African Charter sets up an 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. 183 The Com-
mission consists of eleven African members, 184 with no more than 
one national from any single state,185 who serve for six-year terms 
and are eligible for re-election.186 The Secretary-General of the 
OA U appoints the Secretary of the Commission, and the OA U 
bears the cost of the Commission's staff and services.187 
The functions of the Commission include collecting 
documents, undertaking studies, disseminating information, for-
mulating principles and rules for solving legal problems relating 
to human rights, and interpreting provisions of the Charter .188 The 
Commission can receive a communication or complaint from any 
state which is a party to the Charter ,189 and it must resort to any 
appropriate method of investigation.190 It may seek an amicable 
175. Id. art. 12. 
176. Id. art. 13. 
177. Id. art. 14. 
178. "Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory 
conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work." Id. art. 15. 
179. "States Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to pro-
tect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they 
are sick." Id. art. 16, § 2. 
180. Id. art. 17. 
181. Id. art. 18. 
182. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
183. "An African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, hereinafter called 
'the Commission', shall be established within the Organization of African Unity to promote 
human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa." African Charter, supra 
note 158, art. 30. 
184. "The Commission shall consist of eleven members chosen from amongst African 
personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiali-
ty and competence in matters of human and peoples' rights; particular consideration being 
given to persons having legal experience." Id. art. 31, § 1. 
185. Id. art. 32. 
186. Id. art. 36. 
187. Id. art. 41. 
188. Id. art. 45. 
189. Id. art. 49. 
190. Id. art. 46. 
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resolution to all problems, but if none can be achieved, the Com-
mission reports the facts and its findings to the state concerned 
and to the Assembly of Heads of States and Government.191 When 
transmitting its report, the Commission may make such recom-
mendations as it deems useful. 192 
Communications from other than member states can be con-
sidered by the Commission, subject to approval by a simple ma-
jority of its members.193 Such communications must indicate their 
authors, be compatible with the Charter, be written without in-
sulting language directed against the state concerned, and be bas-
ed on more than mere news disseminated through mass media.194 
Applicants for relief under the African Charter must also have ex-
hausted local remedies, if any exist, unless that procedure is undu-
ly prolonged.195 These restrictions on admissibility are similar to 
the ones imposed by the European Convention.196 Where com-
munications make it appear that serious or massive violations of 
human rights exist, the Commission must bring the situation to 
the attention of the appropriate government officials.197 
In contrast to the European Convention, the African Charter 
expands upon the traditional concept of individual human rights 198 
and emphasizes collective, or peoples', rights199 and individual 
duties to the state. The African Charter declares that individuals 
have the duty to: promote, safeguard and reinforce mutual respect 
and tolerance,200 preserve the harmonious development of the 
191. Id. art. 52. 
192. Id. art. 53. The functions of the African Commission are almost identical to the 
function of the European Commission. See supra text accompanying notes 69-77. 
193. African Charter, supra note 158, art. 55, § 2. 
194. Id. art. 56, §§ 1-4. 
195. Id. art. 56, § 5. 
196. See supra note 108. 
197. African Charter, supra note 158, art. 58. 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12. 
199. Collective human rights have been characterized as third generation human 
rights. First generation rights, such as freedom of thought, expression, and association, are 
those which require that the government abstain from interfering with the individual. Sec-
ond generation rights, such as decent working conditions, social security, and education, 
are those which make a claim upon the government for intervention in the economic or 
social sphere. Third generation rights, such as the right to development, to an adequate en-
vironment, and peace, are those which make a collective claim upon the government and can 
be realized only through the concerted efforts of governments at an international level. Col-
lective rights are concerns of a planetary nature. See Marko, Emerging Human Rights: A 
New Generation for the 1980's? 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435 (1980-81). 
200. African Charter, supra note 158, art. 28. 
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family, 201 serve the national community with their physical and in-
tellectual abilities,202 refrain from compromising national 
security, 203 preserve and strengthen social and national 
solidarity,204 as well as strengthen national independence and ter-
ritorial integrity ,205 work and pay taxes,206 preserve and 
strengthen positive African cultural values,207 and contribute at all 
times and at all levels to the promotion and achievement of 
African unity.208 
The African Charter reflects the historical and cultural dif-
ferences between Europeans and Africans.209 It holds that nothing 
shall justify the domination of one people by another,210 and declares 
that all peoples have the inalienable right to self-determination.211 
The Charter proclaims the right of colonized or oppressed peoples 
to free themselves by any means recognized by the international 
community,212 and asserts that all peoples who are struggling to 
liberate themselves from foreign domination have the right to 
assistance from states party to the African Charter.213 These con-
cerns for self-determination emerged from the African ex-
periences of colonial domination and struggles for independence. 214 
The collective rights recognized in the African Charter include 
the peoples' right to dispose freely of their wealth and natural 
resources.215 The Charter recognizes an obligation to promote inter-
201. Id. art. 29, § 1. 
202. Id. art. 29, § 2. 
203. Id. art. 29, § 3. 
204. Id. art. 29, § 4. 
205. Id. art. 29, § 5. 
206. Id. art. 29, § 6. 
207. Id. art. 29, § 7. 
208. Id. art. 29, § 8. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 110-15. 
210. African Charter, supra note 158, art. 19. 
211. "All peoples shall have right [sic] to existence. They shall have the unquestionable 
and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen." Id. art. 20, § 1. 
212. Id. art. 20, § 2. 
213. Id. art. 20, § 3. 
214. Under colonial rule, foreigners who constituted a small minority of the population 
claimed the right to rule the majority. Many of the twenty million people in southern Africa 
struggled against this harsh reality. See COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA, supra note 12. 
215. "All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right 
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be depriv-
ed of it." African Charter, supra note 158, art. 21, § 1. 
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national economic cooperation,216 and requires its members to 
undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation, 
particularly that exercised by international monopolies.217 Rights to 
economic, social and cultural development, 218 and to a satisfactory 
environment favorable to development, 219 are similarly 
recognized.220 The Charter also affirms a right to national and inter-
national peace and security, including a prohibition against allowing 
territories to be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities 
against the people of any state party to the Charter.221 
The African Charter's emphasis on collective and economic 
rights is not surprising, given the grave economic problems facing 
Africa.222 In recent years, many African leaders have advocated a 
new concept of economic development; a concept which em-
phasizes minimum poverty, expanding employment, and greater 
socio-economic equality. 223 African countries are particularly apt to 
216. "The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without pre-
judice to the obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual re-
spect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law." Id. art. 21, § 3. 
217. Id. art. 21, § 5. 
218. Id. art. 22. 
219. Id. art. 24. 
220. The concept of development as a human right emerged about the same time that 
African peoples, formerly subjugated to foreign and colonial domination, were achieving in-
dependence in the early 1960's. The concept of development as a right is relative and 
dynamic. It encompasses economic, social, cultural, and political content. Any particular 
model of development will be shaped by the history, culture, and religious traditions of the 
people who seek to exercise that right. The recognition of development as a right implies 
not only that a state may not forestall the normal process of development, but also that it 
has a positive duty to protect and promote its citizens' development. See Espiell, The Right 
of Development As a Human Right, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 189 (1981). 
221. "All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security. 
The principles of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the 
United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organization of African Unity shall govern 
relations between states .... States parties to the present Charter shall ensure that: (a) any 
individual enjoying the right of asylum ... shall not engage in subversive activities against 
his country of origin or any other State party to the present Charter; (b) their territories 
shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people of any 
other State party to the present Charter." African Charter, supra note 158, art. 23, §§ 1-2. 
222. The dominant economic policy under colonialism was the extraction of African 
agricultural commodities and mineral resources, and the creation of monopolistic industrial 
production. There was no substantial accumulation of capital among Africans. Though 
political independence is now a fact, most African states continue to have staggering income 
inequalities, with much of their population in absolute poverty. See Langdon & Mytelka, 
Africa in the Changing World Economy, in AFRICA IN THE 1980's: A CONTINENT IN CRISIS 123 
(C. Legum, l.W. Zartman, S. Langdon & L. Mytelka eds. 1979). 
223. Since the early 1960's, developing countries have pressed for an international 
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link economic rights with human rights because human survival 
needs are frequently not met in Africa. 224 Under such conditions, 
the protection of human rights may require more than just 
restraining governments from abusing their citizens; it may re-
quire preventing governments from neglecting their citizens. 225 
Difficult problems arise when economic rights are incor-
porated into law, however. Governments seeking to secure 
economic rights for their citizens must set economic standards, 
allocate resources to implement those standards, and develop 
mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance with the stan-
dards. Advantaged classes will be threatened by a human needs 
approach which transfers income to benefit the poor.226 It may also 
appear necessary for governments to curtail some civil and 
political rights in order to meet the chosen economic standards.227 
Even if the state's obligation to its citizens' economic well-being is 
accepted, and a political arrangement for achieving that level of 
subsistence is in place, there remains uncertainty concerning the 
appropriate economic strategies for achieving the desired stan-
dard.228 
system more conducive to their needs. Many African leaders advocate a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), a full-scale program for restructuring the international economic 
order which is based on the proposition that a system that allows or strengthens the ine-
qualities rampant in the world economy cannot be considered just. For a discussion of the 
NIEO and its legal dimensions, see Fatouros, The International Law of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order: Problems and Challenges for the United States, 17 WILLIAMETTE 
L.J. 93 (1980-81). 
224. Famine confronts more than 150 million Africans today. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, 
at A2, col. 3. 
225. Professor Lowell Schechter discusses the future of human rights in light of basic 
human needs. He notes that for every person shot to death in Uganda, one hundred may 
have starved to death in other African states. See Schechter, The Views of "Charterists" 
and "Skeptics" on Human Rights in the World Legal Order: Two Wrongs Don't Make a 
Right, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 357, 370-83 (1981). 
226. There is a belief among some that it is not scarcity which is the first problem, but 
maldistribution. Governing classes have broad control over communications, land, tools, 
technology, education, and health services. A shift from subsistence crops to cash crops 
benefited those in power, and the basic human needs approach would undermine that gain. 
See Paul, supra note 114, at 29-30. 
227. For example, to eradicate hunger and ill health, developing states with limited 
educational facilities can allocate careers to those they educate, and require a reciprocal 
period of service to the state. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to determine how to 
balance political and economic rights: decisions must be made as to which rights should be 
curtailed, under what conditions, and to what degree. See remarks by Neville Linton, senior 
lecturer at the Institute of International Relations, in Schechter, supra note 225, at 375-76. 
228. For example, the state's goal of feeding all its people might be met by importing 
food, by importing agricultural technology, or by some other means. 
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African states, unlike European nations, do not share a 
cultural identity. They do, however, share a history of colonial ex-
ploitation, hard-won independence, and grave economic problems. 
The scramble for independence in Africa coincided with agitation 
for African unity, as though suffering together in the past paved 
the way for working together for the future. 229 Regional integra-
tion strategies are important in Africa, and the OA U and its new 
African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights make a positive 
contribution to the process of regional cooperation. It is too early 
to tell how effectively the African Charter can influence human 
rights problems,230 but there is reason to believe that it can help 
bring respect for human rights in Africa a step closer to realiza-
tion. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION TODAY 
During the past decade, the Council of Europe has explored a 
number of ways for improving the European Convention. The idea 
of empowering the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings at 
the request of either a national court or the Commission was 
seriously considered. In 1977, however, this idea was deemed inad-
visable by the Steering Committee for Human Rights.231 In 1978, 
229. Pan-Africanism, a belief in the cooperation and unity of all Africans, was par-
ticularly widespread in the early 1960's, when various African states gained their in-
dependence. This mutuality of interest in freedom among African peoples and countries is 
discussed in Emerson, Pan-Africanism, XVI INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (Spring 1962), 
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 437 (1966). 
230. There are severe obstacles to the realization of the right to development which is 
embodied in the African Charter. Making that right a reality would require that developed 
countries accept a share of the responsibility for the well-being of millions who live in ab-
solute poverty, which would involve a drastic change in worid economic and legal order. 
There is a persuasive moral argument that developed countries have been at least partially 
responsible for creating that impoverishment through their political and economic ac-
tivities, and that they should therefore accept some responsibility for the well-being of 
those in poverty. Quite apart from the moral obligation, it may be in the best interest of the 
developed countries to ward off major political and social upheavals by attempting to 
eliminate the problem of absolute poverty. But, neither the political will nor the economic 
infrastructure necessary to carry out such a program currently exists. See Schechter, supra 
note 225, at 278-80. 
231. In 1974 the Committee of Ministers asked the Committee of Experts on Human 
Rights to consider the idea of empowering the Court to give preliminary rulings requested 
by national courts. The Committee of Experts was replaced in 1977 by the Steering Com-
mittee on Human Rights. This Committee noted that the direct applicability of the Euro-
pean Convention varied in the legal systems of the contracting states, and that it would 
therefore be difficult to achieve a uniform interpretation of the Convention by the national 
courts in the various states. It was also feared that such preliminary rulings would require 
the Court to assume some of the investigatory functions currently bestowed upon the Com-
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perhaps influenced by Third World concerns, the Committee of 
Ministers decided to explore the possibility of extending the list of 
protected rights to include social, economic, and cultural rights.232 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has 
recently recommended the addition of the following rights to the 
Convention: the right to freely choose or accept a paid activity; 
the right of access to free employment services, vocational 
guidance and vocational training; the right to an adequate stan-
dard of living in the event of involuntary unemployment; and the 
right to be affiliated with a social security scheme.233 These rights, 
although economic in nature, would be conferred directly upon the 
individual. Thus, although European states are beginning to think 
about economic rights as human rights, their considerations con-
tinue to be grounded in the concept of an individualistic social 
order, in contrast to the African concept of collectivist rights.234 It 
is difficult to see how even individualistic economic rights can be 
promoted and protected by the adjudicatory provisions of the 
European Convention, just as it is difficult to see how economic 
rights can be incorporated into African law.235 Perhaps one must 
regard such rights as goals, rather than mandates, and hold the 
state responsible merely for moving in their direction.236 
The European Convention has served to expand both the 
credibility and visibility of human rights issues. In fact, the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities237 has already declared 
that the European Convention is an international treaty to be used 
to supply legal guidelines which should be incorporated into the 
mission. The idea of empowering the Court to give preliminary rulings at the request of the 
Commission was likewise deemed unwise, both because of its potential to confuse the func-
tions of the two bodies and because of its likelihood of prolonging the proceedings by in-
troducing an additional stage. R. BEDDARD, supra note 34, at 178. 
232. Any additional rights would be included in a further protocol. Since many states 
consider the Fourth Protocol to be poorly drafted, see supra note 106, it is important that 
any new protocol give full consideration to the jurisprudence of the Commission and the 
Court. R. BEDDARD, supra note 34, at 178. 
233. Id. at 181. 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 198-206. 
235. See supra discussion accompanying notes 224-26. 
236. Even states which regard these economic rights as fundamental human rights 
disagree over whether they should be included in the European Convention. Because 
economic rights are not easily justiciable, some argue that to include them would limit the 
scope of all of the substantive rights found in the Convention. See R. BEDDARD, supra note 
34, at 179-81. 
237. See supra note 61. 
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general framework of Community law.238 The Court of Justice's in-
tegration of fundamental rights into Community law has been 
praised by the Commission of the European Communities.239 In 
April 1979, the Commission recommended European Communities' 
accession to the European Convention.240 
V. CON CL US/ON 
The status of human rights in the world has been difficult to 
assess. There is little consensus on the definition, scope, and con-
tent of human rights,241 and ethnocentric perspectives cause 
researchers to assess human rights problems differently.242 Even 
in instances which evidence agreement that certain abuses con-
stitute human rights violations, it is difficult to assess the efficacy 
of international human rights organizations in dealing with them. 
No one can say whether the abuses would have taken a harsher 
form, or whether additional abuses would have occurred, had 
there been no human rights machinery or climate of concern.243 
The efficacy of international human rights organizations, 
238. Nold v. Comm'n [1974] E.C.R. 491. 
239. The Commission of the European Communities was created by the Treaty 
Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities 
(Merger Treaty), Apr. 8, 1965, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. 152) 2 (July 13, 1967) (effective July 1, 
1967), art. 9. This Treaty was signed in Brussels by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, and the Netherlands. The Commission acts as the executive branch of the Com-
munity and negotiates its international agreements. 
240. Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human 
Rights-Comm 'n Memorandum, 12 BULL. EuR. COMM. (No. 4 Supp. Feb. 1979). The Commis-
sion has stated the need for a written catalogue of fundamental rights, particularly with 
respect to certain economic and social rights, which are specifically designed for and binding 
on the Community. The process of drawing up such a catalogue will be lengthy, however, 
and formal accession to the Convention represents a desirable interim step. See Ruddick, 
Fundamental Rights: The Protection of the European Citizen, 129 NEW L.J. 1099 (Nov. 8, 
1979). 
241. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4. 
242. Comparative research on international human rights is exceedingly complex. See 
Scarritt, Definitions, Dimensions, Data, and Designs, McCamant, A Critique of Present 
Measures of "Human Rights Development" and an Alternative, and Scoble & Wiseberg, 
Problems of Comparative Research on Human Rights in GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC 
POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO STRATEGIES 115-71 (V. Nanda., J. Scarritt, and 
G. Shepherd Jr. eds. 1981). 
243. Direct evidence that abuses have abated is difficult to produce, and the effec-
tiveness of measures taken against wrongdoers may never be known. Yet there is some 
testimony from those whose rights have been violated that economic or diplomatic sanctions 
have had a positive effect on government recognition of their rights. For example, some 
Soviet dissidents believe that Western pressure on the Soviet Union led to amelioration of 
their plight. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1976, at Al7, col. 1. 
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because of the peculiar behavior of sovereign states, has similarly 
been difficult to assess. Some governments, out of a perceived self-
interest, will subscribe to human rights regulations when they ac-
tually have no intention of complying with them.244 Other govern-
ments, in contrast, will formally avoid subscribing to human rights 
norms although their intention to comply is evident.245 In addition, 
because government officials are unlikely to acknowledge the 
reforming influence of outside criticism on their patterns of 
government,246 measurement of international human rights 
organizations' effectiveness is imprecise at best. 
The frequency of human rights violations in the modern 
world, as compared with past periods, is also difficult to 
measure,247 particularly in light of the probability that contem-
porary human rights violations received greater publicity than in 
the past.248 Critics of international human rights efforts249 often 
244. For reasons associated with public opinion and pride, as well as pragmatic calcula-
tions to avoid censure, governments may be ready to publicly endorse human rights stan-
dards in spite of their unwillingness to uphold such standards in practice. In the absence of 
any real prospect that the human rights will be enforced, it is feasible for such governments 
to pay lip service to the established norms. See R. FALK, supra note 7, at 33. 
245. Governments which desire to protect their sovereign status may be unwilling to 
ratify international agreements even if they support their content. The United States' 
ratification record for human rights is very poor: the U.S. has failed to ratify the Genocide 
Convention, the Racial Discrimination Convention, and the American Convention on Human 
Rights. This result stems from federalism concerns and from an unwillingness to surrender 
domestic sovereignty. M. Sklar & J. Zorn, Report on the Proceedings of the First Interna-
tional Human Rights Teaching Institute at 11, reprinted in 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 104 (Summer 
1981). 
246. Where regimes are unstable and lack secure control of their population, the im-
pact of external pressure to curb human rights abuses can be significant. Such pressure was 
mounted against the regimes of Amin in Uganda, Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, and 
Bokassa in the Central African Empire. These regimes all toppled in 1979, and it is impossi-
ble to know how significant a role external pressure played in undermining them. Also, in 
the past three years military regimes in Ghana, Nigeria, and Upper Volta have yielded to a 
multi-party civilian political system, apparently in response to pressure and criticism levied 
against the military governments. See Weinstein, supra note 139, at 100-01, 130-31. 
247. Any assessment as to possible increased violations is influenced by the defini-
tional parameters of the rights in question and by the subjective bias of the investigators. 
For a discussion of the methodological problems of research on human rights, see Scarritt, 
McCamant, Scoble, and Wiseberg, supra note 242. 
248. It can be argued that what has increased is not the violations themselves, but the 
attention paid to them. An analogous situation is the tremendous increase in the number of 
child abuse cases reported in the United States in the past decade. Few believe that there 
has been a correspondingly massive increase in the incidence of child abuse. Instead, it is 
generally thought that new reporting laws, new definitions of what constitutes abuse, 
greater publicity, and increased public sensitivity account for much of the increase in 
reported cases. Similar factors may be at work in the reporting of international human 
right~ violations. See Schechter, supra note 225, at 364-65. 
249. One such critic is J .S. Watson. He blames the jurisdictional problems of interna-
32
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 9
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/9
1983) Human Rights in Europe and Africa 167 
point to the wide discrepancies between human rights law and 
political reality. 250 But, extensive media coverage of states that 
violate the rights of their citizens is not a viable justification for 
abandoning international efforts to safeguard human rights just as 
the fact that newspapers are full of stories about murders is not a 
reason for abandoning domestic efforts to create lawful order.251 
No matter how ineffective the mechanisms for protecting human 
rights appear to be, it is important that human rights violations 
not be accepted passively. 
Science and technology have brought about a compression of 
time and space, an increase in the frequency of interaction be-
tween people of different nations, and a change in people's expec-
tations. At the same time that aspirations are increasing, the 
world is experiencing population growth, dwindling resources, en-
vironmental degradation, and political instability.252 Whatever 
uncertainty there may be about the efficacy of international 
human rights protections, it is important that human rights not be 
relegated solely to state sovereigns, where political pressures 
tend to produce leaders whose credibility is based upon their 
capacity to achieve short term goals.253 Local passions and pre-
judices can lead to human rights violations, even in liberal 
democratic states.254 
tional law, and the discrepency between the fact of human rights violations and the ex-
istence of international law which supposedly prohibits such violations. He believes that 
proponents of an international regime of human rights ignore political reality. Watson, 
Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the D-evelopment of Human Rights Norms in Inter-
national Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609. 
250. Freedom House, created in 1941 as a private defender of U.S. interests in a world 
at war, has since 1973 published an annual "Comparative Study of Freedom" for each na-
tion. Developed by Dr. Raymond Gastil, this survey focuses on political rights and civil 
liberties. According to its latest report, 1.5 billion people in seventeen countries lost some 
political rights and freedoms in 1980. N. Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1981, at Al4, col. 3. 
251. Some believe that the incidence of violations of international rules is not any 
greater then the incidence of violations of domestic laws in major American cities. See 
Sohn, supra note 26, at 350. 
252. Schechter discusses the potential impact of population growth, international 
migration, declining rates of economic growth, and environmental decay, on political stabili-
ty and human rights in the 1980's. Schechter, supra note 225, at 383-96. 
253. The problems created by population growth, environmental decay, and economic 
decline give rise to discontent and political instability. Under such conditions, maintaining 
control of the people becomes a paramount concern, and political leaders are tempted to 
substitute coercive rules for consensual decision-making in an effort to alleviate their most 
urgent problems. Falk maintains that sovereign power is increasing and frequently becom-
ing more militarized, augmenting the state's capacity for the repression of human rights. 
The realization of human rights on a global scale thus requires some modification of the 
state system. R. FALK, supra note 7, at 6 & 395. 
254. For example, the British Government's ostensible mistreatment of East African 
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Global organizations for protecting human rights are troubled 
by a lack of consensus regarding the content and scope of the 
ostensibly protected rights, and by the difficulty of creating 
mechanisms to ensure compliance.255 These limitations can be par-
tially overcome by regional human rights organizations which ac-
tually promote the perceived interdependence and self-interest of 
their member states.256 Regional organizations can also employ 
diplomatic and economic sanctions more effectively than either 
global organizations or private human rights groups.257 Thoughtful 
assignments of power to regional organizations, such as the Euro-
pean Convention and the African Charter, can help both to main-
tain world political focus on human rights, and to nudge states in 
the direction of respect for the human worth and dignity of their 
people. 
Carol M. Tucker 
Asian immigrants was brought before the European Court of Human Rights. East African 
Asians v. United Kingdom, [1970] Y.B. EURO. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 928 (Eur. Ct. of Human 
Rights). Additionally, American Constitutional guarantees have not always protected 
American blacks from systematic human rights violations. 
255. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. 
256. Friedman finds the universal sphere of human rights to be primarily a Western 
philosophical construct which saddles human rights with dilemmas and impracticalities, and 
provides no actual relief, remedy, or reparation to the victims of violations. Domestic 
jurisdiction for human rights, he contends, primarily protects the state, sealing it off from 
external machinations. The increasing internationalization of human rights, through 
regional treaty obligations and conventions, provides a promise for the future. Friedman, 
Human Rights Internationalism: A Tentative Critique in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 2, at 29. 
257. See supra note 25. 
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